TENDRIL
DeFiHackLabs added a replay of the TENDRIL attack from November 4, 2026. The replay is a test anyone can run to see how it worked. Their notes say: Lost: ~$555K drained from the pair / ~$541K payout reported (estimate). This PoC forks one block before the exploit tx and reconstructs the attacker side with a fresh contract and typed interface calls on the real verified contracts, no vm[.]mock, no vm[.]store and no vm[.]prank of any protocol identity (the single vm[.]prank relocates the attacker's own pre-held TENDRIL working capital from its holder contract into the fresh exploit contract, not a protocol account): it takes the real 30,641,402 USDT flash loan from the PancakeSwap Infinity Vault (no deal() for the borrowed USDT), buys TENDRIL ammo through the unrestricted USDT-FLAP-TENDRIL route, skews the pair with a 4,097,517 USDT buy, then sells back in one swap whose 30% tax auto-triggers the controller's sellToken and controlburn, draining the pair's USDT reserve from 555,670 to ~0 and repaying the loan in the same lock. Net profit 308,959.367543173232679069 USDT, matching the on-chain profit sweep to the wei; the attacker's net is below the full drained reserve because the controller routed part of it to its own fee recipients. The attacker's ~33.06B TENDRIL of pre-positioned working capital was accumulated permissionlessly, not from any privileged source: funding address 0xb87cf5 bought it across 57 ordinary USDT swaps from the unrestricted secondary USDT/TENDRIL pool 0xda0bc72c over ~11 days (net ~7.4K USDT), then moved it to the exploit contract in a setup tx ~147 blocks before the exploit. That secondary pool is depleted at the fork block, so the amount cannot be re-bought atomically on the fork; the PoC forks after the accumulation and relocates the real, already-held on-chain balance into the fresh exploit contract rather than deal()-minting it. It is ordinary attacker capital, not the flash-borrowed asset and not the exploited value.
Lost: ~$555K drained from the pair / ~$541K payout reported (estimate). This PoC forks one block before the exploit tx and reconstructs the attacker side with a fresh contract and typed interface calls on the real verified contracts, no vm[.]mock, no vm[.]store and no vm[.]prank of any protocol identity (the single vm[.]prank relocates the attacker's own pre-held TENDRIL working capital from its holder contract into the fresh exploit contract, not a protocol account): it takes the real 30,641,402 USDT flash loan from the PancakeSwap Infinity Vault (no deal() for the borrowed USDT), buys TENDRIL ammo through the unrestricted USDT-FLAP-TENDRIL route, skews the pair with a 4,097,517 USDT buy, then sells back in one swap whose 30% tax auto-triggers the controller's sellToken and controlburn, draining the pair's USDT reserve from 555,670 to ~0 and repaying the loan in the same lock. Net profit 308,959.367543173232679069 USDT, matching the on-chain profit sweep to the wei; the attacker's net is below the full drained reserve because the controller routed part of it to its own fee recipients. The attacker's ~33.06B TENDRIL of pre-positioned working capital was accumulated permissionlessly, not from any privileged source: funding address 0xb87cf5 bought it across 57 ordinary USDT swaps from the unrestricted secondary USDT/TENDRIL pool 0xda0bc72c over ~11 days (net ~7.4K USDT), then moved it to the exploit contract in a setup tx ~147 blocks before the exploit. That secondary pool is depleted at the fork block, so the amount cannot be re-bought atomically on the fork; the PoC forks after the accumulation and relocates the real, already-held on-chain balance into the fresh exploit contract rather than deal()-minting it. It is ordinary attacker capital, not the flash-borrowed asset and not the exploited value